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   NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 






PAMCAH-UA LOCAL 675 PENSION FUND; CLAYTON HOLLISTER, 
                                               Appellants 
v. 
 
BT GROUP PLC; IAN LIVINGSTON; GAVIN E. PATTERSON; 
TONY CHANMUGAM; NICK ROSE; LUIS ALVAREZ; RICHARD CAMERON 
____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. No. 2-17-cv-00497) 
District Judge:  Honorable Kevin McNulty 
____________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
March 5, 2021 
____________ 
 
Before:  KRAUSE, PHIPPS, and FUENTES, Circuit Judges. 
 









* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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PHIPPS, Circuit Judge. 
In this putative class action, two investors – a pension fund and an individual – sue 
BT Group along with several of its officers and directors for federal securities fraud.  The 
investors allege that BT Group, a multinational telecommunications company formerly 
known as British Telecom, overstated profits for several years due to fraudulent 
accounting at one of its subsidiaries, BT Italy.  They bring claims under Sections 10(b) 
and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, see 15 U.S.C. §§ 78j(b), 78t(a), and 
Securities and Exchange Commission Rule 10b-5, see 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b–5. 
But securities fraud is not easy to allege: the Private Securities Litigation Reform 
Act imposes a heightened pleading standard for such claims.  Under that statute, a 
complaint must “state with particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that the 
defendant acted with the required state of mind.”  15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2)(A); see also 
id. § 78u-4(b)(1) (requiring the pleading to specify “each statement alleged to have been 
misleading [and] the reason or reasons why the statement is misleading”).  That required 
state of mind is scienter – the intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud either knowingly 
or recklessly.  See In re Hertz Glob. Holdings Inc., 905 F.3d 106, 114 (3d Cir. 2018); 
Institutional Invs. Grp. v. Avaya, Inc., 564 F.3d 242, 252 (3d Cir. 2009).  Thus, 
allegations must support an inference of scienter that is “more than merely plausible or 
reasonable—it must be cogent and at least as compelling as any opposing inference of 
nonfraudulent intent.”  Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rts., Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 314 
(2007).   
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In exercising subject-matter jurisdiction over this case, see 15 U.S.C. § 78aa; 
28 U.S.C. § 1331, the District Court dismissed the investors’ fourth amended complaint 
for failure to state a claim for relief because their allegations of scienter did not meet the 
heightened pleading standard.  The investors filed a timely notice of appeal, invoking this 
Court’s appellate jurisdiction.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
On appeal, the investors defend the sufficiency of their scienter allegations on two 
grounds.  First, they contend that the allegations as to the Chairman of BT Group’s Audit 
Committee, Nick Rose, support a strong inference that he acted with scienter, and they 
seek to impute his mental state to BT Group.  Second, the investors argue that their 
allegations regarding executives at BT Global Services and BT Italy, two other 
components of the BT Group corporate family, also support a strong inference of 
scienter.  The investors then seek to impute the alleged mental states of those executives 
to BT Group by urging this Circuit to adopt the so-called ‘corporate scienter doctrine.’  
See, e.g., In re Omnicare, Inc. Sec. Litig., 769 F.3d 455, 474–76 (6th Cir. 2014).  On de 
novo review, see City of Edinburgh Council v. Pfizer, Inc., 754 F.3d 159, 166 (3d Cir. 
2014), we reject the investors’ arguments and will affirm the judgment of the District 
Court. 
I.  
The investors claim that BT Group overstated profits for several years, and when it 
eventually reported its profits accurately, its share price fell.  BT Group’s financial 
statements reported profits from BT Italy and included notations that BT Group was 
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examining the control environment at BT Italy.  In an October 2016 press release, BT 
Group identified prior overstatements of profits of approximately £145 million due to 
“certain historical accounting errors” stemming from inappropriate management behavior 
at BT Italy.  Fourth Am. Compl. ¶ 66 (JA265).  Later, through a January 2017 press 
release, BT Group announced that the overstatement of profits had exceeded £530 
million.  After those revelations of accounting fraud, BT Group’s publicly traded 
American Depositary Receipts (ADRs) lost more than 20% of their value (or 
approximately £8 billion in market capitalization).  But to state a claim for securities 
fraud, the investors’ allegations must give rise to a strong inference that BT Group made 
those false financial statements with scienter.   
II. 
Several of the investors’ allegations support an inference that Rose, the Chairman 
of BT Group’s Audit Committee, made various assertions with scienter in BT Group’s 
financial statements.  As far back as 2013, the Audit Committee had concerns about BT 
Italy.  And BT Group’s SEC filings from 2013 and 2014 reported that the Audit 
Committee was monitoring internal controls and risk management at BT Italy.  The 
investors also allege that in November 2015, BT Italy employees told a BT Global 
Services executive about accounting irregularities.  They further allege that the Audit 
Committee knew in 2016 of a culture of bullying at BT Italy.  Even with that cumulative 
alleged knowledge, BT Group’s financial statements reported improvements in the 
control environment at BT Italy in 2014, 2015, and 2016. 
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The problem for the investors is that their allegations also support the inference 
that BT Group intended to detect and prevent fraud.  For example, at the Audit 
Committee’s request, BT Group’s Board of Directors visited BT Italy to review 
operations and meet with various personnel.  BT Group also investigated the reports of 
workplace bullying at BT Italy.  In addition, BT Group repeatedly disclosed concerns 
about BT Italy to the SEC, and it reported monitoring and investigating that situation and 
responding to internal complaints.  Finally, BT Group voluntarily disclosed its prior 
inaccurate reporting, including the 2016 announcement of an approximately £145 million 
write-down for historical accounting errors at BT Italy, and the 2017 follow-up 
announcement that the write-down totaled £530 million.  In sum, the investors offer 
several allegations supporting an inference that Rose acted with scienter, but those 
allegations are comparatively weaker than the contrary inference that he did not.  See 
Tellabs, 551 U.S. at 314. 
III. 
The investors’ remaining allegations of scienter similarly fail.  The allegations 
regarding executives at two other components of the BT Group corporate family – BT 
Global Services and BT Italy – do not give rise to a strong inference of scienter.  
In attempting to allege scienter for executives at BT Global Services, one of BT 
Group’s lines of business, the investors rely on foreign news articles.  As amended, the 
complaint alleges that Italian prosecutors investigated and charged those executives, CEO 
Luis Alvarez and CFO Richard Cameron, for complicity in false accounting at BT Italy.  
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But the investors do not allege the crimes charged, the facts supporting the charges, or the 
extent (if any) to which the Italian charges implicate BT Group’s securities filings in the 
United States at the time of the charged conduct.  The investors also rely on other news 
articles quoting email correspondences.  But they do not allege that Alvarez or Cameron 
sent, received, or even knew about those emails.  Nor do those emails mention Alvarez at 
all.  Instead, they concern Cameron’s financial goals for the company.  Through a third 
party, those emails report that Cameron wanted operating profit to increase by €700,000, 
that he suggested capitalizing labor costs as a solution, and that he would not accept an 
earnings estimate for an upcoming fiscal year below a certain amount.  Additional articles 
quoting BT Italy executives include the executives’ statements that they shared all 
economic and financial transactions with Alvarez and Cameron.  Taken cumulatively, 
while also accounting for the vagueness of some allegations as well as the attenuation 
inherent in the second- and third-hand nature of some of the other allegations, the 
pleading is at most consistent with an intent to commit financial statement fraud.  But that 
does not suffice under the ordinary pleading standard of plausibility, much less the 
heightened standard imposed by the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act.  See Bell 
Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557 (2007) (explaining “[t]he need at the pleading 
stage for allegations plausibly suggesting (not merely consistent with) [liability]”); GSC 
Partners, 368 F.3d at 239.  Thus, even if the mental states for the BT Global Services 
executives could be imputed to BT Group (an issue not addressed today), these 
allegations would not support a claim for securities fraud. 
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The allegations regarding executives at BT Italy fall short, too.  Those executives, 
CEO Giancarlo Cimini and CFO Luca Sebastiani, worked at BT Italy, a subsidiary of BT 
Group.  But “parent companies are not, merely by dint of ownership, liable for the acts of 
their subsidiaries.”  Fried v. JP Morgan Chase & Co., 850 F.3d 590, 595 n.2 (3d Cir. 
2017).  Even if our circuit embraced the corporate scienter doctrine, the investors would 
still need to plead that BT Group participated in BT Italy’s alleged fraud – for example, 
through a cover-up.  See Rahman, 736 F.3d at 246.  Here, the investors make no such 
allegations. 
* * * 
Because the investors failed to plead that BT Group acted with scienter, they do 
not state a claim under Section 10(b).  And that shortcoming forecloses their derivative 
claim under Section 20(a).  See Avaya, 564 F.3d at 280.  Accordingly, we will affirm the 
judgment of the District Court dismissing the fourth amended complaint. 
